Industrial Policies of North America and Their Implications for U.S. Trade and Investment Relations by Morrissy, J. David
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 7 | Number 3 Article 3
Summer 1982
Industrial Policies of North America and Their
Implications for U.S. Trade and Investment
Relations
J. David Morrissy
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. D. Morrissy, Industrial Policies of North America and Their Implications for U.S. Trade and Investment Relations, 7 N.C. J. Int'l L. &
Com. Reg. 331 (2016).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol7/iss3/3
Industrial Policies of North America and Their
Implications for U.S. Trade and Investment
Relations
by J. David Morrissy*
A North American trade accord between Canada, Mexico, and the
United States evokes little enthusiasm today despite years of expanding
trade and investment. Worldwide recession, high unemployment levels,
economic disruption due to shifting oil prices, overextended indebted-
ness, and recent devaluations of Canadian and Mexican currencies
sharply discount the projected benefits from closer economic interdepen-
dence. More deep-rooted and intractable than these economic phenom-
ena are the divergent industrial policies that inhibit further North
American market coalescence. For Mexico, trade is an "instrument for
development."' For Canada, "Canadianization" of industry means a
specific industrial strategy to which foreign trade and investment are
subordinated. For the most part, U.S. policy toward industry is neutral
and is based on the general principle of freedom of the domestic market-
place and liberalized access to it for all producers, domestic and foreign.
The North American asymmetrical trade and industrial policies tend to
cause distortions in the pattern of trade and investment flows and pose
significant hurdles in the way of negotiations for a North American trade
agreement, even if it were eagerly desired.
This article provides a comprehensive review of the complex inter-
action of the industrial and trade policies of Canada and Mexico, and
the impact such policies are having on their trade relations with the
United States. Part I outlines the potential conflict between national
industrial development programs and the need for a liberalized North
American trade system. Parts II and III examine the trade policies and
industrial development plans of Mexico and Canada, respectively, and
Part IV considers various North American trade arrangements currently
in operation. Finally, Part V emphasizes the need to examine North
* Senior International Economist, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. The views
expressed in this article are those of the author and are not intended to represent official views
or policies of the U.S. Government.
I GSP, Countervailing Duty Concerns Highlight FBA's Mexican Trade Session, 7 U.S.
Import Weekly (BNA) No. 1, at 7 (October 6, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Countervailing Duty
Concerns] cites Alfredo Gutierrez Kirchner, Minister-Counselor of Trade, Mexican Embassy,
Washington, D.C.
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American trade relations with a view to developing a shared perspective
and a common framework within which the United States, Canada, and
Mexico can work toward greater harmonization of their trade policies
and practices. U.S. trade relations have not been static, and many of the
issues discussed in this paper have been, and continue to be, subject to
significant changes in policy.
I. North American Trade and Investment
Trade and investment flows have increased the degree of interde-
pendence among Canada, Mexico, and the United States. In 1981, U.S.
trade with Canada2 and Mexico 3 amounted to $87 billion and $32 bil-
lion, respectively. Trade with the United States accounts for two-thirds
of the total trade flows of Canada 4 and Mexico.5 While only one-fourth
of total U.S. trade was with these countries, Canada and Mexico were
the first and third largest U.S. trading partners in 1981.6
Likewise, sizeable investment flows doubled in the 1970's. In 1979
alone, U.S. direct investment in Canada amounted to $41 billion7 and in
Mexico, $4.5 billion." In the same period, Canada's direct investment in
the United States amounted to $7 billion.9
The underlying impetus for continuing expansion of North Ameri-
can trade and investment remains the enormous complementary assets
with which the North American continent and adjacent countries are
endowed: mineral resources, vast, fertile farmlands, and varying popula-
tion growth levels. In addition to enormous reserves of oil, gas, and hy-
droelectric power sources, the North American region possesses from one-
fifth to one-third of each of the world's basic ferrous and nonferrous
metal ore deposits.10 North American farmland yields one-fifth of the
total world grain supply."
The expansion and rising affluence of the Canadian, Mexican, and
U.S. population, currently at 319 million, 12 will likely cause subtle
changes in North American trade flows. An uneven growth in popula-
tion already is changing profoundly the relative size of national markets.
2 U.S. Dep't of Comm., 63 Survey of Current Bus. No. 3, S-19 to S-20 (March 1982).
3 Id.
4 U.S. Int'l Trade Commission, Pub. No. 1176, Background Study of the Economic and
International Trade Patterns of the Countries of North America, Central America, and the
Caribbean 136 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Background Study].
5 Id.
6 Id. at 127.
7 Id. at 30.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 34.
10 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, North American Trade Agreements, A Study
Mandated in Section 1104 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Trade Agreements].
II Id. at 3.
12 Current and projected regional populations for North America, in millions, are as
follows:
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By the year 2000, the region's population will exceed 390 million.' 3
Nearly sixty percent of that growth will occur in Mexico.
14
A. Industrial Development
To prepare for population expansion, many North American coun-
tries are turning to industrial development policies to stimulate job crea-
tion and raise income levels. For some countries the domestic situation is
already critical. Unofficial estimates place Mexico's unemployment rate
today at twenty percent, and its combined unemployment and underem-
ployment rate was forty-nine percent in 1979 according to official Mexi-
can estimates. 15 On the other hand, relatively underpopulated Canada
has turned to industrial development policies to prevent the erosion of its
industrial base. However, Canada's efforts to build its industry behind
higher tariff walls means that firms serve smaller markets with shorter
production runs and higher production costs than those in the United
States.
Both Canada and Mexico are attracted by the job generating pros-
pects of supplying the enormous U.S. market. At the same time, they are
apprehensive that closer trade ties might draw reverse flows of U.S. trade
and investment into their own domestic markets and preempt the devel-
opment of their national industries. Therefore, both countries have tried
to diminish the relative intensity of their trading relationships with the
United States.
Logically, there are two means by which Canada and Mexico can
diminish the intensity of their U.S. trade. One is to solicit increased
trade and investment with the Western European countries and Japan.
The other is to spur industrial development through domestic enterprises
and admit U.S. trade and investment only where the advantages out-
weigh the disadvantages of increased U.S. presence in the economy. Ca-
nada and Mexico both have taken each of these approaches. They are
the two basic elements of the strategy that in the 1970s Canadians re-
ferred to as their "third option."
The first option was to hold relations with the United States to the
status quo. The second was to seek a "special relationship" by way of
closer integration between Canada and the United States. Although the
third option, the stimulation of both European and Japanese trade and
domestic industrial development, may not be considered an overwhelm-
1980 Projected 2000
United States 225 252
Canada 24 28
Mexico 70 116
319 396
Background Study, supra note 4, at 6.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 26.
334 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
ingly successful experiment, its motivating force derived as much from
cultural and political affirmations of sovereignty as from economic calcu-
lations. That Canadian spirit of independence no longer favors a "spe-
cial relationship" between Canada and the United States. Mexico has
always been wary of any special relationship with the United States.
Consequently, both Canada and Mexico have sought to diminish their
economic involvement with the United States and to develop a broad
competitive industrial base. To that end they have adopted policy direc-
tives to guide and encourage industrialization, particularly in selected
sectors, to maintain control over energy resources, to foster native owner-
ship of industry by controlling access to investment, to enhance foreign
investment effectiveness by setting performance requirements, and, in all
these, to improve their trade balance with the United States. Yet the two
countries pursue these goals by different mechanisms with little similarity
in the ways their methods relate both to the United States and to each
other.
B Liberalized Trading System
No one can challenge the right and responsibility of a country to
protect its political and economic sovereignty. However, when industrial
and trade policies adopted to foster economic development conflict with
the trading rights of trade partners, the results can be disastrous. Rela-
tions between the countries may deteriorate seriously if there are no
mechanisms for resolving trade disputes. On the other hand, if the poli-
cies go unchallenged, other countries might adopt similar policies which
could cause an erosion of the benefits of a free trading system and possi-
bly precipitate a wave of protectionism. Developing countries might
then adopt reciprocity measures to curtail imports from countries that
appear to exploit the system.
The countries of North America not only need a mechanism by
which to resolve the trade disputes that invariably arise, but also need a
shared understanding that continued liberalization of North American
trade is beneficial to all participants. Unfortunately, when the North
American countries decided that special relationships with the United
States did not serve their interests, they did not develop a new, integrat-
ing vision for North American trade relations. As a result, considerable
tension now attends the resolution of bilateral trade disputes.
Multilateral mechanisms, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), 16 are helpful, but they generally lack a framework
with a regional perspective and shared objectives. The GATT provides
16 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor slgnalure October 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. GATT is not a single treaty. It resulted
from a United Nations conference on Trade and Employment, and its text was attached to the
final Act of the Conference. The U.S. accepted GATT in Protocol for the accession of signato-
ries of the Final Act of October 30, 1947, 62 Stat. 3663, T.I.A.S. No. 1887, 62 U.N.T.S. 68.
Numerous protocols have amended GATT. See, e.g., Protocol amending the general agreement
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rules and procedures for resolving trade disagreements among its eighty-
seven members. Both Canada and the United States are signatories, and
both on occasion have resorted to GATT dispute resolution mechanisms
when informal bilateral efforts were not effective.17 The current degree
of trade liberalization that exists in world markets is derived from tariff
and nontariff concessions worked out in past GATT negotiating sessions.
Such concessions are binding in justice because other signatory nations
made compensatory concessions; therefore, they cannot be unilaterally
rescinded.
II. Mexican Trade Policies
With Mexico, the United States has neither a shared vision of their
trade relations nor a trade agreement mechanism. Except for a bilateral
reciprocal trade treaty entered into during World War II, which Mexico
allowed to expire in 1950,11 there has been no formal trade agreement
between the two countries. Mexico participated actively in the Tokyo
Round of the GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) and was
preparing to make trade concessions to the United States in return for
U.S. trade concessions. However, in March 1980, after domestic discus-
sion revealed a widespread apprehension that compliance with the newly
negotiated codes, especially the subsidies code, might prevent the use of
incentives designed to foster its industrial development policies, Mexico
reversed its apparent earlier willingness to join the GATT and an-
nounced its decision not to become a signatory nor to adhere to the
MTN nontariff codes.' 9
Since Mexico has rejected the multilateral approach to trade agree-
ments, the prospects for a trade agreement with Mexico on a bilateral,
trilateral, or regional basis are moot. The principal difficulty that the
United States faces is that as a signatory to the GATT any agreement it
makes bilaterally must be consistent with its fundamental obligations
under the GATT rules. 20 Accordingly, it would be difficult for the
United States to devise trade advantages it could concede to Mexico that
it would not make to all GATT signatories. Even if the United States
could put together bilateral concessions that are attractive to Mexico, it
to introduce a part IV on trade and development and to amend Annex I, Feb. 8, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 6193.
'7 For example, negotiations under GATT Article XXVIII began in 1978 at the initiative
of the United States due to Canadian revision of duties on fruits and vegetables. See Twenty-
Fourth Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program
83 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Trade Agreements Report].
18 Ventana Associates, Inc., Mexican Industrial Development Plans: Implications for
United States Policy 237 (1981) (prepared for the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce
and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative) [hereinafter cited as M.I.D.P.].
19 Id. at 40-41.
20 According to Article I of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, signatories must
grant to other signatories what is granted to its "most favored nation" for the item in question.
See, GATT, supra note 16, at 61 Stat. A3, A12.
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might be unwise as a matter of policy to offer better terms outside the
GATT framework than Mexico could get within it. The reason which
President Jos6 L6pez Portillo gave in his 1980 State of the Union
message for not joining the GATT would seem to apply to all trade trea-
ties with equivalent obligations: "We must not allow that which is wo-
ven in one part of our development to be unwoven in another.
21
What are the development policies that must not come undone
through enactment of trade agreements? The major policy areas that
might obstruct negotiation of a trade agreement relate to industry, en-
ergy, and agriculture. Mexico's development policies have been shaped
in an environment of international independence and relative isolation.
Mexico has remained detached from global commitments, and until the
recent discovery of the country's oil resources, the world largely ignored
it. When Mexico nationalized its oil industry in 1938, it made clear that
it had reasserted control over its development without regard to foreign
interests. Now that it is one of the major world producers of petroleum,
it still remains outside the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC). Mexico looks upon its oil as its special patrimony, a re-
source to be drawn upon frugally and developed without regard to world
demand.22 However, this stance is softening under the pressure of Mex-
ico's current economic problems.
Mexico has allowed its role as a world leader to evolve in one area,
namely its function as a spokesman for developing countries. Mexico
still regards itself as a developing country, although it is now emerging as
an industrialized nation. Its industrial growth, most of which occurred
prior to its recent oil discoveries, was accomplished through determined
development efforts. How it will handle its trade responsibilities to other
nations as it graduates from a newly industrializing country to a devel-
oped country remains to be seen. The current crisis will make this trans-
formation significantly more difficult.
The continuity of the development policies affecting Mexico's trade
relations is of legitimate concern as Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado suc-
ceeds L6pez Portillo. Since L6pez Portillo selected de la Madrid, 23 a
basic compatibility of viewpoint is anticipated, and de la Madrid's back-
ground reinforces that expectation. Like L6pez Portillo's, de la Madrid's
career has been in public administration, his education in law and public
administration, and his technical experience in finance and
programming.24
21 State of the Union Address by President Portillo (Sept. 1980), reprinted in M.I.D.P.,
supra note 18, at 42.
22 M.I.D.P., supra note 18, at 67-68.
23 Id. at 44-45.
24 Id.
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A. The Global Plan2 5
As Minister of Planning and Budget, de la Madrid was the architect
of L6pez Portillo's Global Plan. When de la Madrid introduced the plan
in 1980 he cautioned that "the Plan is not a map finished to precision
that will carry us mechanically to the objectives."' 26 Nonetheless, the
plan is probably a reliable indicator of Mexico's future domestic policies
just as it is built on the antecedent development plans that de la Madrid
participated in developing, such as the National Industrial Development
Plan (NIDP).2 7
The current crisis undoubtedly will prompt Mexico to make major
modifications in the NIDP, which has various incentives designed to pro-
mote expansion in targeted industries. Primary emphasis was given to
food processing. The next development priority concerned the capital
goods sector, especially food processing equipment manufacturers, and
machine and tool suppliers to basic industries, especially petrochemicals,
electrical generation, mining and metallurgy, construction, and transport
vehicles and equipment. 28
Where the NIDP assigns priorities to investment in certain indus-
tries and regions, it rewards investors that comply by means of a complex
set of incentives. The NIDP incentives take various forms. A credit, or
CEPROFI, can be earned against taxes in amounts of up to thirty per-
cent of the fixed value of assets when investments are made in specified
regions or industries.29 A small firm, for example, by investing in a food
processing plant using domestically produced capital goods in a region
designated for preferential development, could earn the maximum tax
credit. By initiating additional work shifts, thereby creating more jobs
and increasing productivity, it could earn a twenty percent tax credit
within the thirty percent ceiling. (See Appendix, page 449).
The NIDP also established a tax credit system whereby a credit, or
CEDI, was granted against indirect and value-added taxes in proportion
to both the domestic content and the value added. 30 A firm with high
proportions of both could secure credits of up to eighty percent of its tax
liabilities. Additional credits were issued for firms that raised their ex-
port levels from year to year. In 1981, these incentive systems were
linked, making them available during the tax year once a stipulated por-
tion of a firm's output has been exported. 3 1 In August 1982, Jos6 Gutier-
rez Kirchner reported that this major program was suspended when the
rest of eligible articles were eliminated. The CEDI was no longer needed
25 Id. at 15.
26 Id.
27 See generally id. at 60.
28 Id. at 20-22.
29 Id. at 22-24.
30 Id. at 26-27.
31 Id. at 27-28.
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because the peso was no longer overvalued. 32 While recent major deval-
uations make Mexican products competitive in export markets, produc-
tion bottlenecks may limit the volume of products that can be made
avalaible for export.
Incentives also take the form of low-cost energy supplies. For exam-
ple, firms locating in the preferred zones or along the natural gas pipeline
benefit from purchases of gas at thirty-two cents per thousand cubic feet
(cfm), while it is currently sold at the border to U.S. producers at $4.94
per cfm.3 3 Petrochemical firms locating in preferred zones can get addi-
tional discounts of up to thirty percent on gas, as well as oil and electric-
ity, provided they export twenty-five percent of their output.
34
At a time when U.S. deregulation policies are permitting gas and oil
to rise to world price levels, low-cost energy incentives give Mexican
firms in fuel-consuming industries a competitive advantage. Internation-
al firms competing in Mexican export markets may charge that Mexico's
low-priced fuels constitute an import subsidy for manufacturers in the
same way that U.S. firms using regulated natural gas have been chal-
lenged. Furthermore, because Mexico is not a GATT signatory, there is
no requirement that an importing country find an injury to its industry
before imposing countervailing duties.35 Even if Mexico were conceded
the benefit of an injury test prior to the imposition of countervailing du-
ties, such concession would be contingent on a Mexican decision to phase
out the incentives in question. Mexico would face a troublesome di-
lemma. It needs the export market as an outlet for its developing indus-
try, but it needs the incentives to develop its industry along the lines of its
various industrial growth plans. The United States and Mexico are cur-
rently negotiating a bilateral "substantially equivalent" agreement that
would grant Mexico the injury test in exchange for restrictions on its
subsidies.
B. National Energy Plan (NEP) 36
The Mexican Constitution reserves the ownership of subsurface
minerals to the Mexican Government. 37 Although Article 27 of the Con-
stitution of 1917 affirmed the national patrimony of subsurface minerals
in Mexico, the exercise of rights over petroleum resources was acceded
during the next two decades to foreign individuals and firms. 38 Not until
the nationalization of foreign oil holdings in 1938 was the principle of
national ownership irrevocably affirmed. As a consequence, Mexico
32 Countervailing Duty Concerns, supra note 1, at 8.
33 M.I.D.P., supra note 18, at 24.
34 Id. at 24-26.
35 Id. at 238.
36 Id. at 67-76.
37 A. Gandora, R. Nehring & D. Ronfeldt, Mexico's Petroleum and U.S. Policy: Implica-
tions for the 1980's 42-46 (1980) (prepared for U.S. Department of Energy).
38 Id.
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keeps all energy dealings with foreign oil firms in the context of arm's-
length transactions.
In its NEP introduced in November 1980, Mexico dedicated the use
of its energy resources to the development of domestic industry, not to
supplying foreign markets. Until recently Mexico has been unmoved by
U.S. energy security needs, viewing U.S. dependence on Mexican oil as a
threat to its own sovereignty. 39 Fearful of any foreign dependence on its
oil, Mexico based its NEP on the dual principles of nationalism and con-
servation. It set clear and explicit limits on trade in energy resources.
The plan stipulated that oil exports would not exceed 1.5 million barrels
a day, not more than half of which would go to any one country. 40 Al-
though Mexico thereby signaled to U.S. oil firms the limits of depen-
dence on its oil, namely 750,000 barrels a day, economic conditions have
forced a change in that policy. In light of Mexico's current financial
crisis, it is increasing production to more than two million barrels per
day with more than 50 percent going to the United States. The United
States for its part made an advance payment of $1 billion for Mexican oil
for the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
4 1
Similarly, the plan limits natural gas exports to 300 million cubic
feet per day.42 L6pez Portillo had made arrangements in 1977, at some
political risk, to build a pipeline to the U.S. border to sell natural gas to
the United States. Stung by the United States' rejection of the offer,
L6pez Portillo committed Mexico's gas resources to fueling Mexican in-
dustry instead.43 Nonetheless, because of the recent weakening of oil
prices, Mexico has begun to explore the possibility of doubling its sales of
natural gas to the United States and discussions are once again under
way with interested U.S. buyers.
44
Whatever the prospects for increased fuel trade with Mexico, devel-
opment of Mexico's own refining industry will generate demand for a
large flow of equipment imports. For example, when PEMEX, Mexico's
nationalized oil industry, purchased $2 billion worth of refining equip-
ment in 1979, more than half of it came from foreign suppliers, of which
the United States supplied two-thirds. 45 PEMEX, which planned to
continue building through 1986, estimated that imports of another $8
billion worth of equipment, calculated at 1978 prices, would be
needed.46 PEMEX projections must be revised downward substantially
and estimates of demand for imported equipment reduced accordingly in
view of the current accounts crisis.
39 Id. at 60.
40 M.I.D.P., supra note 18, at 68.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 67.
44 Mexico will not increase gas exports until 1983, J. of Corn., May 6, 1982, at 22B, col. 4.
45 M.I.D.P., supra note 18, at 71.
46 Id.
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The pattern of energy trade with Mexico will evolve in subtle and
complex ways especially in light of the erosion of Mexico's determination
to limit such trade. Mexico's needs, not only for foreign exchange to
finance its industrial independence, but also for technological develop-
ment, have already lead Mexico to raise its energy trade level to acquire
technology from potential trading partners. In fact, Mexico's offers to
sell its oil to European countries as a bargaining chip to obtain techno-
logical know-how no longer command the premium they did when there
was little talk of oil gluts. As U.S. energy prices are rising to world levels
because of deregulation, the United States is actually retrenching on its
consumption of imported fuels. In 1981, U.S. imports of oil dropped 11.7
percent. 47 The irony of U.S.-Mexico energy trade relations is that the
less fuel the United States needs to import, the more it seems it can rely
on Mexico for supplies.
C Szskema Ah'menlar'o Mexican (SAM)48
A dramatic change in traditionally agricultural Mexico occurred in
the past decade. Once a net exporter of agricultural products, Mexico
now is a net importer. 49 The change was caused by a combination of
several years of drought in the 1970s and policies designed to restrain
food price increases for the expanding population. 50 These conditions
aggravated productivity in the agricultural sector, and as a result agri-
cultural land and resources were shifted from cultivation of domestic
food supplies to the commercial production of beef, fruits, and vegetables
for export. Dependence on agricultural imports increased as imports of
corn, wheat, sorghum, and soya jumped from 3.4 and 3.6 million tons in
1978 and 1979 to 7.2 millions tons in 1980. 5 1
Private commercial farmers, on the other hand, have been successful
in growing fruit and vegetables for U.S. consumption during the winter
months. For example, such farmers supply sixty percent of the U.S. win-
ter market for tomatoes.52 Production of winter vegetables provides a
livelihood for an estimated 350,000 Mexican workers, 53 but it may be
reaching the maximal feasible ceiling. Since Mexican tomatoes reach
the U.S. markets well before U.S.-grown tomatoes, Mexican producers
receive premium prices. Florida winter vegetable growers have often
charged the Mexican growers with dumping their products in the U.S.
markets. Although a recent U.S. Government investigation did not sub-
47 Bach, U.S. International Transactions, Fourth Quarter and Year 1981. Surv. Current
Bus. 41 (March 1982). Bach points out that "for the year, the average number of barrels im-
ported daily declined to 6.25 million from 7.08 million."
48 M.I.D.P., supra note 18, at 31.
49 Id. at 143.
50 Id. at 32, 143.
51 Id. at 32.
52 Id. at 255. Exports to the United States of other winter. vegetables are substantially less
than exports of tomatoes. Id.
53 Id. at 256.
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stantiate the charges, the case is currently on appeal. 54
However successful Mexico has been at producing for export, its real
challenge lies in increasing food production for domestic consumption.
Mexico's population of seventy million grows annually by 2.9 percent,
and therefore, considering Mexico's gradually increasing per capita in-
come, the demand for basic food stuffs should increase by two to eight
percent. 55 To meet this challenge, L6pez Portillo introduced SAM in the
spring of 1980.56
SAM sets forth incentives to develop the less productive agricultural
sectors in the marginally rain-fed regions. It aims to make Mexico self-
sufficient in corn and beans by 1982 and to meet the minimally sound
nutrition requirements for the poor rural sectors. SAM's incentives in-
clude preferential credits, subsidies on seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and
crop insurance for corn and bean crops. These incentives, like those in-
corporated in the NIDP, are subject to the challenge that they are subsi-
dies and thus may be vulnerable to the imposition of countervailing
duties. Despite these incentives, the 1982 severe drought is likely to
oblige Mexico once again to import huge amounts of foodstuffs.
D. National Plan for Agro-Industrial Development (NPA D) 57
The NPAD, also released in early 1980, sets the goals and parame-
ters for Mexico's agribusiness development. It is intended to guide the
actions of the public sector and provide incentives to the social and pri-
vate sectors. It supplements SAM in that it seeks to effect institutional
changes in Mexico's agribusiness sector.58 Some of the NPAD mecha-
nisms, like those used in NIDP and SAM, may encounter challenges
from producers that sell in markets to which Mexico exports. Fiscal in-
centives, public investment, subsidies, and restrictions on foreign invest-
ment and business are practices that will be carefully scrutinized by those
competing with Mexican imports.
III. Canadian Trade Policies
The Canadian Government clearly exerts a positive force on Cana-
dian business development. This is demonstrated by its efforts to estab-
lish a national energy firm, Petro-Canada, 59 to "Canadianize"
industries,6° and to review foreign investment according to the contribu-
54 Trade Agreements, supra note 10, at 39, 41.
55 M.I.D.P., supra note 18, at 167.
56 Id. at 33.
57 Id. at 169-75.
58 Id. at 170-71.
59 P. Morici, A. Smith & S. Lea, Canadian Industrial Policy 118 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Canadian Industrial Policy]. See also W. Armstrong, L. Armstrong & F. Wilcox, Canada and
the United States: Dependence and Divergence 80 passim (1982) [hereinafter cited as Canada
and the United States].
60 Canada and the United States, supra note 59, at 164.
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tion it can make to Canada."t To the extent that Canada's development
policies have trade-distorting effects, the United States is obliged to
counter them, because Canada is the largest trading partner of the
United States.
Perhaps the tensions generated by this partnership are inevitable;
the two economies constantly interact across the 3,500-mile border
shared by the two independent nations. Canada's land mass stretches
northward nearly three thousand miles across the tundra to the Arctic,
but living space for the majority of its population is limited to the narrow
band of territory within two hundred miles of the U.S. border. 1 -2 The
need for efficiency dictates that firms from both countries reach across
their national border. Few plants could exhaust their economies of scale
by producing goods to supply a market area with a radius of only a hun-
dred miles. Few plants could minimize their transportation costs by serv-
ing an attenuated market area measuring two hundred by three
thousand miles. Similarly, advertisers ignore the border as they broad-
cast their messages into each other's country to promote their products
and services in as large a market area as they are distributed.
Fostering the development and "Canadianization" of industry inev-
itably has involved the adoption of practices that restrict trade and for-
eign investment and that grant subsidies or other preferences to domestic
firms. This trend has come to the fore dramatically in programs and
legislation initiated by Canada in the past decade. The result is unbal-
anced accessibility to the markets of the two countries.
A. Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA)" 3
Canadians have long been critical64 of the "branch plant" strategy,
which they have attributed to foreign firms that invest in Canada. By
this strategy, foreign firms tend to establish their plants to supply the
surrounding Canadian market and escape the relatively higher tariffs.
Canadians have argued that these plants tend to be less integrated into
total company operations, to expend less on research and development,
and to be the first plants closed by the home office when slackening de-
mand forces cutbacks in productions. 65 To counter these inefficiencies of
the "branch plant" syndrome, Canada instituted the policy of "Canadi-
anizing" the local industry and, in 1973, established FIRA to carry out
this policy. FIRA's objectives were to increase Canadian control over
61 Canadian Industrial Policy, supra note 59, at 85-86; Canada and the United States,
supra note 59, at 82, 165.
62 S. Birnbaum, Canada 1980 3 (1979).
63 Canadian Industrial Policy, supra note 59, at 85 passim. See also Canada and the
United States, supra note 59, at 118.
64 Canada and the United States, supra note 59, at 120.
65 Canadian Industrial Policy, supra note 59, at 86-87. Morici lists ten criteria for FIRA
acceptance of foreign investment proposals and includes such things as additional employment,
investment, productivity, innovation, technology, and exports.
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foreign investment in Canada and to ensure that Canada benefits from
such investment. Firms intent on entering Canada are screened carefully
for their expected contribution to Canadian development, but no reports
on the FIRA reviews are issued. In addition to the lack of public infor-
mation on the FIRA administrative procedures, successsful U.S. firms
often refuse to disclose the terms on which they agreed to secure permis-
sion for their proposed investment.
FIRA has the authority to impose performance requirements that
affect both imports and exports as conditions of entry into Canada.66
The requirements may stipulate that a specific percent of a firm's final
product be composed of locally supplied material, or that the firm com-
mit itself to export a specified percentage of its output to earn foreign
exchange for the Canadian host government.
FIRA also may assert an extraterritorial veto power over the trans-
fer of Canadian assets overseas, 67 for example, from one U.S. owner to
another. Practices of this nature pose serious policy questions for U.S.
firms but even more so for the U.S. Government. Although these prac-
tices give Canada more control over its industry, they constitute direct
interference with the free flow of trade and investment transactions
overseas.
In recent years, some Canadians have proposed 68 that FIRA extend
its screening practices to foreign investments that existed prior to the
1973 FIRA enactment. Canada's retroactive extension of the screening
investment practice might have discriminatory and possibly ex-
propriatory implications. A retroactive application of the FIRA provi-
sions may be contrary to the letter and spirit of international obligations,
such as those outlined in the 1976 OECD agreement on national treat-
ment for foreign firms,69 and could nullify some of the benefits of previ-
ous trade concessions. In the April 1980 "speech from the throne," the
Canadian Government announced its intention to expand FIRA's scope
beyond new investment screening to include performance reviews of ex-
isting investments, especially in technologically advanced industries. 70
This provoked a vigorous protest from the United States. 71 Subse-
quently, in its budget presentation in November 1981, the Canadian
Government committed itself to refrain from expanding FIRA's man-
date for the time being and to complete an administrative review of
66 Canada and the United States, supra note 59, at 121.
67 Id. at 124. An instance of this occurred when the U.S. firm, Dow Jones, acquired an-
other U.S. firm, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., that had a wholly owned Canadian subsidiary. A
Canadian court held that the acquisition was subject to FIRA review.
68 Drouin & Malmgren, Canada, the United States and the World Economy, Foreign Aff.
Winter 1981-82, at 402-403 [hereinafter cited as Canada, the U.S. and the World Economy].
69 International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD, 1979 ed.), 11-
13, reprinted in Canada and the United States, supra note 59, at 109.
70 Canada and the United States, supra note 59, at 122.
71 Canada, the U.S. and the World Economy, supra note 68, at 402-403.
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FIRA.7 2 An extensive cabinet shuffle in September 1982, in which the
forceful head of FIRA was replaced by the former Minister of State, is
widely regarded as a signal of Canada's easing of its implementation of
nationalist economic programs, such as FIRA and NEP.
B. Natzonal Energy Plan (NEP) 73
More recently, the Canadian Government has sharply focused the
"Canadianization" process on its energy sector. Announced in 1980, the
NEP is designed to increase Canadian ownership and control of the
country's energy sector. In some ways, it seeks to reacquire the energy
concessions made in the past to foreign firms. The implementing legisla-
tion, introduced in the Canadian Parliament in 1981, 7 4 has provisions
that some Americans view as discriminatory and expropriatory 75 and sig-
nificantly departs from internationally accepted principles of fair and eq-
uitable treatment of foreign investments.
The motives behind the legislation are complex. They concern not
only "Canadianization" of the industry but also development of a federal
energy base to counterbalance the current energy-rich provinces. 76
While Petro-Canada, a federal energy entity, ultimately will emerge
strengthened as a result of the NEP, the foreign subsidiaries of energy
firms will be adversely affected by the discrimination. Canada's justifica-
tion for the "Canadianization" of the energy industry rests on the gov-
ernment's perceived need7 7 to reduce foreign ownership from the
prevailing seventy percent level.
One provision of the NEP arrogates to the Canadian Government a
twenty-five percent share of all leases on Canadian federal lands. 78 In
return for this twenty-five percent share of oil and gas production reve-
nues, the Canadian Government will compensate firms for twenty-five
percent of their exploration and drilling costs incurred in developing pro-
ductive wells. The costs incurred for nonproducing wells are not
reimbursable.
With control over Petro-Canada, a substantial energy supplier, the
government will be in a better position to pursue its proposed policy of
supplying energy to Canadian industry at eighty-five percent of world
prices. Reportedly, these prospects are regarded grimly by energy firms
in Canada, who fear uncertainty and instability as much as constraints
72 Id.
73 Canadian Industrial Policy, supra note 59, at 92; Canada and the United States, supra
note 59, at 86.
74 Canada, the U.S. and the World Economy, supra note 70, at 402.
75 The legislation appears designed to ensure that only Canadian firms benefit from NEP
and similar programs. This necessarily involves a denial of equal opportunity to foreign firms
and their subsidiaries. Id. See also Canada Pays a Price for its New Nationalism, Bus. Wk.,
August 17, 1981, at 42.
76 Canada and the United States, supra note 59, at 40-41.
77 Id. at 86-87.
78 Id. at 87; Canada, the U.S. and the World Economy, supra note 71, at 401.
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on their profitability. 79 U.S. firms, especially those using petrofuel as
feedstock, also are concerned about the competitive edge the lower
priced feedstocks will give its Canadian counterparts now that U.S. natu-
ral gas feedstock prices are being deregulated.8 0
Despite the projected benefits of the NEP, its overall effect, espe-
cially during the prolonged economic downturn, has not been beneficial
to Canadian energy firms. They have endured losses or low levels of
profits, whereas their multinational counterparts in Canada have reaped
substantial profits.8 1
C Border Broadcasting
Apart from the energy and foreign investment policy thrusts de-
scribed above, many individual areas of trade across open borders can be
distorted by government administrative practices. One such practice
was designed to benefit the Canadian domestic broadcast industry. Ca-
nada decided in 1976 that the estimated $15 million in advertising costs
expended by Canadian firms for broadcast time on U.S. radio stations
were not acceptable tax deductions.82 Because this practice threatened
to cut their revenues, U.S. broadcast firms appealed to the U.S. Trade
Representative for redress.8 3 In the same year, a U.S. tax law was en-
acted disallowing taxpayer deductions for the costs of attending more
than two conventions each year outside the United States.84 Canada,
standing to lose $100 million in revenues, objected. 85 U.S. broadcasters
quickly seized on the retaliatory linkage of the convention tax deduction
with the Canadian tax deduction ban on U.S. broadcasting advertise-
ments.8 6 U.S. revisions of tax laws, however, undid the linkage,8 7 and
when President Jimmy Carter presented separate legislation countering
the Canadian restriction on U.S. broadcast cost deductions to Congress,
it was not passed.88 A subsequent initiative by President Ronald Reagan
has been submitted to Congress. These events illustrate how difficult it is
to define and impose appropriate retaliation, especially cross-product re-
taliation. Often an industry is reluctant to accept, at some cost to itself,
79 Canada and the United States, supra note 59, at 89.
80 See Canadian Industrial Policy, supra note 59, at 98.
81 The Canadian Economy is in Crisis, Bus. Wk., June 28, 1982, at 80-87.
82 Westell, Poison Pinpricks, Foreign Pol'y, Winter 1980-81, at 101.
83 Trade Agreements Report, supra note 22, at 83. The complaint that the Canadian
advertising tax education policy was an unfair trade practice under § 301 of the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-42 (1975), as amended by Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-33, 93 Stat. 44, 295-96 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(Supp. IV 1980)).
84 Westell, supra note 82, at 101. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 602,
90 Stat. 1573 (repealed 1980).
85 Westell, supra note 82, at 101.
86 Id.
87 Id. See Act of Dec. 28, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-608, § 4, 94 Stat. 3550, 3552-53 (codified at
26 U.S.C. § 274(h) (West Supp. 1982)).
88 Westell, supra note 82, at 101.
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trade restrictions that are designed as a mode of retaliation to benefit
another sector.
D. Canadian Bank Act8 9
Canada enacted the Bank Act on December 1, 1980; it remains in
effect until 1991. The Act enables foreign banks to enter Canada as
chartered banks, although its provisions are carried out independently of
FIRA.90 Like FIRA, however, the Act sets conditions for entry, namely
that the entrant be judged admissible according to the potential contri-
bution it can make to competitive banking in Canada. 91 Furthermore,
foreign banks will find that their admission will depend on the degree of
reciprocity their home jurisdiction affords to Canadian banks. 92 While
existing foreign banks with branch networks are allowed to continue
under a grandfather clause, 93 new foreign bank entrants will be granted
one main and one branch office with additional branches at the discre-
tion of the Canadian minister. 94 Licenses will be subject to renewal an-
nually for the first five years and reviewed triennially thereafter.9 5
Another constraint is that assets of foreign bank subsidiaries be limited to
eight percent of the total assets of Canadian domestic banks.96
While all countries subject their banking industry to regulations,
Canada's restraints limit not only the entry of banks but also the growth
potential of the foreign banks within the Canadian banking sector.
However, U.S. imposition of reciprocal sanctions against Canada's bank-
ing laws, should it ever be needed, would be complicated, because of the
large number of state regulatory jurisdictions involved.
E Government Procurement
Government procurement to foster Canadian development is a type
of intervention policy that might be anticipated as a preferred practice.
Recently, the procedure for this practice has been formalized with the
establishment of a Procurement Review Mechanism, according to which
the Treasury Board ensures that government purchases for goods and
services over $2 million and construction over $10 million meet govern-
ment objectives. 9 7
On December 30, 1981, Canada became a signatory to the GATT
Procurement Code.98 While discriminatory procurement practices must
89 Trade Agreements, supra note 10, at 32.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Canadian Industrial Policy, supra note 59, at 122.
98 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Status and
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be eschewed, according to the terms of the Code,99 significant areas of
purchasing by federal, provincial, and local government, as well as by
Crown Corporations, are not covered by the Code. The Canadians, for
their part, object to individual state "Buy American" laws'0° and espe-
cially to the federal constraints imposed by the U.S. Surface Transporta-
tion Act' 01 which affect purchases of transportation equipment, an area
in which Canada possesses a comparative advantage.
IV. Sectoral Trade Arrangements
The divergent policies of the United States, Canada, and Mexico
toward industrial development, trade, and investment suggest that much
groundwork must be accomplished before a regional multilateral trade
agreement is feasible. The appeal of such an agreement appears limited
at this time, notwithstanding the vast complementary assets that form a
basis for the extensive intraregional trade existing today, because the
enormous interdependence that such trade flows represent has evolved
not through government agreements but largely through private sector
initiatives.
Nonetheless, Canada and Mexico realize the importance of an open
U.S. market, a market that accounts for two-thirds of their total world
trade. 10 2 At the same time they are conscious of their sovereign responsi-
bility to adopt industrial policies to benefit their citizenry. Tension arises
when this conflicts with the responsibility of remaining an equitable
trading partner in a liberal trading system.
Whatever the prospects for an overall trade agreement among
North American countries, some concrete steps have been taken by the
governments of these countries to deal constructively with trade opportu-
nities. There is solid economic justification for the arrangements in some
cases, as in the Auto Products Trade Agreement of 1965 (APTA) 10 3 and
the cross-border electricity sharing arrangements, 0 4 where U.S. summer
peak demand for air conditioning complements with compelling econ-
omy Canada's peak winter usage of electricity for heating and lighting.
Other arrangements have important concessionary aspects, such as
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 10 5 and the Border Industry
Acceptances of Protocols, Agreements, and Arrangements, at 5, U.N. Doc. L/4914/Rev.5
(1981).
99 House Comm. on Ways and Means, Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, International Codes Agreed to in Geneva, Switzerland April
12, 1979, Agreement on Government Procurement, Part II, 1. (Comm. Print 1979).
100 Canada and the United States, supra note 59, at 172.
101 Id. at 172-73.
102 Background Study, supra note 4, at 248-49, 270-71.
103 Canada and the United States, supra note 59, at 132-36; Canada Industrial Policy,
supra note 59, at A-8; Background Study, supra note 4, at 116-18.
104 Canada and the United States, supra note 59, at 95-96.
105 M.I.D.P., supra note 18, at 256. See generally Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
A Guide to the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (1981).
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Program (BIP).106 The GSP authorization is scheduled to expire Janu-
ary 4, 1985. These programs create an estimated 260,000 jobs and
131,000 jobs, respectively.' 0 7 Winter vegetables marketed in the United
States in the face of considerable opposition from domestic growers gen-
erate incomes for another 350,000 Mexicans. I0 8 While continuance of
such programs may be contingent upon Canada's and Mexico's mainte-
nance of acceptably equitable trade relationships with the United States,
the BIP in Mexico and the APTA with Canada are illustrative of ar-
rangements that, with adaptations, may be suitable for application to
other potential trade expanding arrangements.
A. Mexican Border Industries
After the discontinuance of the "bracero" farm worker program in
1964,109 the United States participated in setting up a border program in
1965. To encourage industrial development in Mexico along the U.S.
border, a tariff concession was extended to in-bond plants, or maqui-
ladoras, in Mexico." 10 This concession allows the Mexican plants to im-
port U.S. products, holding them in bonded plants for further processing,
and then to re-export them in finished products while paying U.S. duty
only on the value added by the processing in Mexico. The plants that
qualify for these concessions are those designated as producing goods
listed under Sections 806.30 and 807 of the U.S. Tariff Schedule."'
Mexican legislation has further enhanced the incentives for locating
along the border. In 1971 Mexico established a Public-Private Develop-
ment Commission" 2 to oversee regional policies, and in 1972 laws were
modified to grant concessions related to taxes, customs, and transporta-
tion."t 3 In addition to duty exemption on inputs for these in-bond indus-
tries, other special concessions include a ten-year holiday on value-added
taxes,"14 duty exonerations on capital goods imported for local indus-
tries," 5 and discounts on rail and maritime rates." 6
The border program has succeeded because of the cooperation be-
tween the two countries. In the decade of the 1970s, exports under the
plan increased tenfold, plants multiplied fivefold (rising from 120 to 600
establishments), and employment reached 131,000 employees, mostly un-
106 M.I.D.P., supra note 18, at 28-29, 255. See also Background Study, supra note 4, at 65-
66.
107 M.I.D.P., supra note 18, at 255-56.
108 Id. at 256.
109 RedClift & RedClift, Unholy Alliance, Foreign Pol'y, Winter 1980-81, at 120, 122-23.
110 See M.I.D.P., supra note 18, at 29, 255.
III Background Study, supra note 4, at 65-66.
112 M.I.D.P., supra note 18, at 29.
"13 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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skilled women." 7 This success is consistent with both the original aim of
the maquiladora program and the subsequent goals of the Urban Develop-
ment Plan. 1 8 The latter calls for the diffusion of Mexico's population
outside of the overcrowded Federal District where fourteen million of the
country's people now live.19 The program also is consistent with U.S.
objectives of simultaneously fostering employment and fighting inflation,
because U.S.-made components accounted for one-half of the value of
the final products.' 20 In short, the program appears to wed the compara-
tive advantages of both countries. The recent devaluation of the Mexi-
can peso has made these plants more attractive by cutting labor costs in
dollars dramatically, putting them in the range of similar labor costs in
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea. 12 1
Some individuals have proposed a creative extension of this pro-
gram by suggesting a free trade zone along the Mexican-U.S. border as
an inital phase of a complete liberalization of trade in North America.
Ambassador Abelardo Valdez, formerly with the U.S. State Department,
has been a strong advocate of this approach, calling for a free trade band
of 100 or 200 miles on both the Mexican and U.S. sides of the border. 122
Goods produced within the zone would move duty free. While there are
serious administrative barriers to its effective implementation, the con-
cept is provocative and may stimulate the search for additional, creative
solutions.
B. Automotive Products Trade Agreement of 1965 (APTA) 123
The United States and Canada signed the APTA in 1965 to intro-
duce limited free trade in new automotive vehicles and components.
The 1936 domestic content requirement 24 had granted duty-free status
to auto components imported by auto makers in Canada whose produc-
tion was at least sixty percent Canadian in origin. This policy no longer
served Canadian domestic production objectives. Canada's apprehen-
sion at the decline of its domestic auto production from 110 percent of
apparent consumption in the 1950s to 72 percent in the early 1960s 25
led it to enact in November 1962 a policy of remitting the 25 percent
tariff on auto parts whenever auto makers increased their exports over
and above the amount of exports in the prior base period.' 26 The incen-
tive worked. The Canadian content of Canada's automotive exports
117 Id. at 255.
118 Id. at 20.
119 Id.
120 Background Study, supra note 4, at 161.
121 Hayes, Peso Cut Aids Plants at Border, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at DI, col. 4.
122 J. of Com., Nov. 28, 1980, at 10, col. 3.
123 Canadian Industrial Policy, supra note 59, at A-2 to A-8. Canada and the United
States, supra note 59, at 132-36.
124 Id. at A-2.
125 Id. at A-3.
126 Id. at A-4.
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jumped from $9.5 million in 1962 to $65.3 million in 1964.127 However,
U.S. producers of automotive components reacted strongly. A U.S. radi-
ator manufacturer petitioned the Treasury Department to begin a coun-
tervailing duty investigation on the grounds that the duty remission was
an export subsidy.'12 The potential for trade confrontation was high,
and a bold plan for an automotive agreement emerged as a viable
alternative.
In essence, APTA created the basis for an integrated U.S.-Canadian
automotive industry and market. It achieved this by promoting trade in
new automotive vehicles and parts on a duty-free basis. To preserve the
size of its industry, Canada stipulated that the dollar volumes of imports
and exports of automotive products are to be maintained at levels above
those that prevailed prior to the agreement. 129
Both countries have adopted measures to prevent huge transship-
ments from other countries for marketing under the pact. To satisfy the
U.S. requirement, vehicles must have at least fifty percent North Ameri-
can content to enter under the agreement. 130 Canada restricts auto im-
ports under the agreement to bona fide manufacturers and then only if
they maintain specified made-in-Canada to sales-in-Canada proportions
and meet Canadian value-added standards. 13 1
The arrangement has helped the auto industry in both countries to
rationalize production. One measure of the integration achieved is the
sharp increase in automotive trade flows, from $716 million in 1964 to
over $20 billion in 1980.132 An index of the agreement's effectiveness is
that Canada, which has generally been a high-cost producer of goods,
now manufactures automotive products at costs that are within three
percent of those in the United States. The ultimate testimony to APTA's
success, though, is its durability; it has been in force for seventeen years,
and the only proposals for changing it are extensions to cover tires,
aftermarket parts, and special purpose vehicles.
The question arises whether APTA is sufficiently successful to be
proposed as a model for replication in other sectors or in other countries.
There are genuine limitations to its wider application. For one thing, the
oligopoly structure of the auto industry is not typical of most manufac-
turing sectors. There are four major motor vehicle producers in Canada
all of which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of U.S. vehicle manufactur-
ers.' 3 3 This restricted ownership facilitated achieving a consensus prior
to the agreement and monitoring conformance to it afterward.
In addition, despite the relative homogeneity of the industry and the
127 Id. at A-5.
128 Id. at A-6.
129 Id. at A-7.
130 Trade Agreements, supra note 10, at 54.
13' Id.
132 Id. at 53.
133 Background Study, supra note 4, at 116.
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES OF NORTH AMERICA
host countries, problems could yet arise from the different perceptions of
the nature of the agreement. Canada perceives it as a fair share arrange-
ment,1 34 whereas the United States views it as a limited free trade agree-
ment.1 3 5 Market sharing arrangements are conceptually alien to U.S.
public policy, which is based on the normative model of pure
competition.
In the context of North American trade agreements, some suggest
that APTA be extended to include Mexico. Such an extension may
evolve, but not before a greater harmonization of the automotive sectors
in the three countries is accomplished. Of the eight "terminal" auto
makers in Mexico, so called because they have survived the stringent reg-
ulations of the 1962 Automotive Decree,1 36 four are U.S. firms. Their
plants are relatively small and have high operational costs,' 37 although
some new automotive investments are of greater magnitude to capture
economies of scale in production and to provide a source of components
for plants producing "world cars."
The Mexican Automotive Decree of 1977138 fosters the adoption of
import substitution and export promotion strategies through the use of
local ownership incentives, local content requirements, and rebates on
taxes and import duties.' 39 In time, these measures are likely to cause
U.S. subsidiaries in Mexico to increase their production for export to the
United States. Then when they capture a significant share of the U.S.
market for autos and auto parts, they may seek to enlarge the existing
automotive accord with Canada to include the Mexican industry.
Although there are problems with APTA, its success suggests that
consideration be given to exploring the benefits of introducing sectoral
agreements in other industries. Like the genesis of the U.S.-Canadian
auto agreement, sectoral agreements could begin as bilateral accords.
Separate U.S. agreements with both Canada and Mexico might provide
an interim harmony, after which trilateral application could be pursued.
Sectors in which all three countries are variously endowed and in which
trade potential is high include petrochemicals, forest products, transpor-
tation, and the energy sources of coal, electricity, natural gas, and oil.
While the mention of energy triggers apprehensions about U.S. inten-
tions, several other sectors already are being examined jointly by the new
consultative mechanism, the Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade
OCCT).
C Consultative Mechanisms
When Presidents Ronald Reagan and Jos6 L6pez Portillo met in
134 Trade Agreements, supra note 10, at 53.
135 Id.
136 M.I.D.P., supra note 18, at 90.
137 Id. at 91.
138 Id. at 98 passim.
139 Id.
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June 1981, they established a new Joint Committee on Commerce and
Trade (JCCT).140 At the first JCCT meeting on September 21 and 22,
1981 in Mexico City, the participants acknowledged the need for a more
reliable system of prior notification and consultation about changes in
trade policies. Among the specific issues discussed were U.S. counter-
vailing duty laws, Mexico's development incentives program, U.S. sales
of silver from its strategic stockpile, the increase in Mexican tariffs and
import licensing requirements, U.S. policies on graduation within the
Generalized System of Preferences, and the difficulties encountered by
U.S. trucking and engineering firms doing business in Mexico. To ad-
dress these issues constructively and systematically, the JCCT developed
a work program that includes a comprehensive examination of the auto-
motive, petrochemical, computer, and textile sectors. Under the aegis of
the JCCT, the United States and Mexico are looking into an automotive
agreement similar to the U.S.-Canada pact. Mexico's computer plans are
being studied by the JCCT for a similar joint development effort.
So far the JCCT appears to be more.effective than the Consultative
Mechanism established in 1976 and displaced by the JCCT. In addition
to the JCCT, the United States has over a hundred agreements with
Mexico. One of the oldest, the International Boundary and Water Com-
mission, 14 ' founded in 1889, continues to generate distinctive success in
fairly complex cases that ultimately are critical to fostering a sense of
community. However, as long as the meetings of commissions and the
terms of agreements are carried out without a framework that delineates
the long-term objectives shared by North American countries, the efforts
of all these meetings and agreements may be at cross-purposes in the long
run.
Canada and the United States do not have as effective a counterpart
to the U.S.-Mexican JCCT. The Joint Canada-U.S. Committee on
Trade and Economic Affairs,14 2 operating at the cabinet level, acts as a
general policy-making committee. In the past, it has concerned itself
with U.S.-Canada balance-of-payments issues, but its meetings in the
1970s were infrequent, and its importance has diminished.
A number of U.S.-Canadian treaties are important in handling U.S.
relations in areas of specific and critical cooperation. For example, the
Defense Production Sharing Agreement143 directs apportionment of pro-
duction costs of material used in common defense efforts. A separate
board, the Permanent Joint Board of Defense,' 44 serves a consultative
and advisory function to mesh complex, shared military requirements
140 Canada, the U.S. and the World Economy, supra note 68, at 412.
141 F. Huszagh, Comparative Facts on Canada, Mexico, and the United States, 145-46
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Comparative Facts].
142 Id. at 50.
143 D. Murray, An Evaluation of U.S.-Canadian Defense Economic Relationship and its
Applicability to NATO Standardization (1978).
144 Comparative Facts, supra note 141, at 53.
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with political and economic exigencies. Other agreements include Sci-
ence and Technical Cooperation, 45 Resources Development, Conserva-
tion, and Environmental Management, 46 Trade and Energy,1 4 7 Balance
of Payments Committee, 48 Energy Consultative Mechanism,149 Anti-
trust Consultative Mechanism, 5 0 and the International Joint Commis-
sion.' 5' This last arrangement, like its Mexican counterpart, the
International Boundary and Water Commission, 152 is relatively long-
standing, founded in 1909, and is regarded as successful in its endeavors.
D. Communications at the State Level
At the state level, a large number of informal working relations have
developed. These have been classified as on-going agreements, under-
standings, or arrangements. Some 766 of these relationships between the
U.S. individual States and the Canadian Provinces have been identi-
fied.' 53 With Mexico, the relations between the bordering states tend to
be formalized as U.S. State Commissions. The Good Neighbor Commis-
sion of Texas,' 5 4 founded in 1943, is the oldest. Commissions relating to
Mexico were set up in Arizona 55 in 1959, in California 56 in 1964, and
in New Mexico 15 7 recently. Also, the Annual Southwest Border Gover-
nors Conference has had an active influence over the years.
V. Framework for a New Relationship
Despite the significant integration of North American markets
achieved through trade and investment, and despite the numerous com-
munications between government groups at all levels, there remains,
what the Canadian statesman, Maxwell Cohen, described as "a general
poverty in the institutional network that links" the three countries. 58
Likewise, there is a conspicuous absence of a mutually accepted percep-
tion of the relationships among the North American countries. The old
"special" relationships between the United States and each of its neigh-
bors no longer provides policy guidance and support to bilateral consul-
tations. Institutional trade cooperation is especially difficult now,
145 Id. at 47.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 48.
148 Id. at 51.
149 Id. at 52.
150 Id. at 53.
151 Id. at 51.
152 Id. at 145.
153 1 Canadian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Canada-United States Re-
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because the national development policies of Canada and Mexico
sharply diverge from those of the United States.
Yet the divergencies from trade liberalization responsibilities cannot
be ignored. The current world recessionary forces tend to magnify the
negative impact on the U.S. economy of trade and investment distor-
tions. Furthermore, continued U.S. indulgence may be misconstrued by
our trading partners as legitimating acceptance of their trade restrictive
measures.
A search for an overall resolution of trade issues, however, is hin-
dered by the lack of mutually acceptable trade perspectives. If a unify-
ing perspective is to evolve and capture an effective constituency in all
three countries, it must be rooted in a shared vision. That vision must
project an ideal that appeals to a broad range of people in each country,
convey a sense of the mutual benefits promised, and suggest an imple-
menting mechanism that assures an equitable outcome for all
participants.
Sometimes such a vision evolves naturally. More often it is forged
by innovative leaders in the face of widely acknowledged exigencies.
With varying degrees of effectiveness and permanence, Franklin D.
Roosevelt cultivated the Pan American Good Neighbor policy, John F.
Kennedy summoned up the Alliance for Progress, and Ronald Reagan
seeks to launch a Caribbean Basin Initiative.
How can the emergence of a vision of greater North American unity
be deduced from the existing mix of cooperative efforts, conflicting poli-
cies, and expanding trade and investment patterns that characterize
North American economic relations? The Brandt Commission faced a
similar, though greater, challenge when it was established "to study the
grave global issues arising from the economic and social disparities of the
world community and to suggest ways of promoting adequate solutions
to the problems involved in development and in attacking absolute pov-
erty."' 59 It is possible that a commission could be set up to accomplish
for the concept of a North American trade relationship what the Brandt
Commission attempted to do for the North/South concept. The dia-
logue of a dozen or so eminently knowledgeable persons selected for their
preeminence in the business sector, public life, and academic communi-
ties of all three countries might crystallize a conceptual framework for a
viable North American trade arrangement. The report of such a com-
mission should be exploratory and should inform all North Americans of
choices in trade relations that lie ahead and the costs and benefits of
each. Their insights might stimulate a conscious convergence of North
American markets through better coordination of their trade, invest-
ment, and industrial trade policies.
19 W. Brandt, North-South: A Programme for Survival 296 (1980).
